14th Amendment

<body topmargin=0 leftmargin=0 marginheight=0 marginwidth=0><script type="text/javascript" src="http://hb.lycos.com/hb.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://ratings.lycos.com/ratings/lycosRating.js.php"></script> <script type="text/javascript"><![CDATA[//><!]]></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://scripts.lycos.com/catman/init.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://members.tripod.com/adm/ad/code-start.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://members.tripod.com/adm/ad/code-middle.js"></script> <script type="text/javascript" src="http://members.tripod.com/adm/ad/code-end.js"></script> <noscript> <img src="http://members.tripod.com/adm/img/common/ot_noscript.gif?rand=502953" alt="" width="1" height="1" />  <iframe frameborder="0" marginwidth="0" marginheight="0" scrolling="no" width="728" height="90" src="http://ad.yieldmanager.com/st?ad_type=iframe&ad_size=728x90&section=209094"></iframe>  </noscript> <table cellpadding=0 cellspacing=0 border=0 height="100%"><tr> <td valign="top" width=160 BGCOLOR="#FFFBF0" TEXT="#080000" background="067f0f03.jpg"> <div> <A HREF="index.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="Sex War"><U><B>Sex War</b></U></A></div> <div>  <A HREF="id64.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="Discrimination set in law"><U><B>Discrimination set in law</b></U></A></div> <bR> <div> <B>14th Amendment</b></div> <div> <A HREF="id56.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="VAWA Some More Equal Than Others"><U>VAWA - Some More Equal Than Others</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id134.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="Adoption and Child Support"><U>Adoption and Child Support</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id70.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="Rape shield laws"><U>Rape shield laws</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id73.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="Selective Service"><U>Selective Service</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id74.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="The Mann Act"><U>The Mann Act</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id124.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="Equality law puts women first"><U>Equality law puts women first</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id126.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="Feminist police"><U>Feminist police</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id136.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="Title IX discrimination against men in "><U>Title IX - discrimination against men in Sports</U></A></div> <div> <A HREF="id137.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="See no evil"><U>See no evil</U></A></div> <bR> </td> <td valign="top" BGCOLOR="#CCCC99" TEXT="#080000" bgproperties="fixed" background="068f0f03.jpg"> <div> <B>14th Amendment</b></div> <bR> <bR> <bR> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 19 WIDTH="496"><IMG BORDER="0" SRC="1x1.gif" HEIGHT="19" ALIGN="bottom" WIDTH="496" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0"></tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> FindLaw</div> <bR> <div> A look at how supreme court decisions involving sex discrimination as a violation of the 14th amendment equal rights clause or the 5th amendments due process clause has led to a double standard whereby discrimination favoring women is justified and while discrimination favoring men is (rightly) struck down. The court has come to apply a standard of judgment that assumes women need protection in all but the most ridiculous cases, while men do not. In fact it is pushing the same sexual stereotypes it pretends to be attacking. </div> <bR> <div> <B>REED v. REED, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 96 WIDTH="496"><div> A mandatory provision of the Idaho probate code that gives preference to men over women when persons of the same entitlement class apply for appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate is based solely on a discrimination prohibited by and therefore violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=volpage&court=us&vol=404&page=77#77" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> A very reasonable decision striking down an obviously sexist law. I take this as my starting point and searched for all supreme court (sex related) decisions citing this case and developing sex discrimination as a violation of the 14th or the 5th.</div> <bR> <div> <B>STANLEY v. ILLINOIS, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 153 WIDTH="496"><div> Petitioner, an unwed father whose children, on the mother's death, were declared state wards and placed in guardianship, attacked the Illinois statutory scheme as violative of equal protection. Under that scheme the children of unmarried fathers, upon the death of the mother, are declared dependents without any hearing on parental fitness and without proof of neglect, though such hearing and proof are required before the State assumes custody of children of married or divorced parents and unmarried mothers</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/405/645.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> Yup Illinois really had a law saying the state should, without any hearing, steal the children from an unwed father if the "real parent" of the family died. The sex equality angle is only one of the constitutional rights this piece of shit law breaks. Of course if there's one thing you learn looking over this page its that there are a great many stupid sexist laws out there but this is surely the worst on this page. That the state of Illinois in 1972 was insisting on physically breaking up a family at a time of mourning, and then demanding the father had no more chance of adopting his own children than any other single male (IE none at all): "<I>Illinois law affords him no priority in adoption proceedings. It would be his burden to establish not only that he would be a suitable parent but also that he would be the most suitable of all who might want custody of the children. ...Stanley, unmarried and impecunious as he is, could not now expect to profit from adoption proceedings</I>" <B>And Illinois went to court to try to keep this law!</b>!!</div> <bR> <div> <B>FRONTIERO v. RICHARDSON, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)</b> </div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 153 WIDTH="496"><div> A married woman Air Force officer sought increased benefits for her husband as a "dependent" under 37 U.S.C. 401, 403, and 10 U.S.C. 1072, 1076. Those statutes provide, solely for administrative convenience, that spouses of male members of the uniformed services are dependents for purposes of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical and dental benefits, but that spouses of female members are not dependents unless they are in fact dependent for over one-half of their support. </div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=volpage&court=us&vol=411&page=678#678" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> Administrative convenience no excuse for sex discrimination. Men were statistically far more likely to have a spouse as a dependent but that is no reason for discrimination.</div> <bR> <div> <B>GEDULDIG v. AIELLO, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)</b> </div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 191 WIDTH="496"><div> California has a disability insurance system for private employees temporarily disabled from working by an injury or illness not covered by workmen's compensation, under which an employee contributes to an Unemployment Compensation Disability Fund one percent of his salary up to an annual maximum of $85. A disability lasting less than eight days is not compensable, except when the employee is hospitalized. Benefits are not payable for a single disability exceeding 26 weeks. ...Appellees, four women otherwise qualified under the program who have suffered employment disability because of pregnancies....challenged the pregnancy exclusion</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/417/484.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> This one went against the feminists perhaps because the service provided was already identical for men and women. In effect the court said it wouldn't mandate the novel creation of special treatment for women (in pregnancy), even if it turned a blind eye to already existing inequalities favoring women. <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/429/125.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U><B>GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. v. GILBERT, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)</b></U></A><B> </b>is another very similar decision.</div> <bR> <div> <B>KAHN v. SHEVIN, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) </b></div> <div> <B> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 172 WIDTH="496"><div> A Florida statute grants widows an annual $500 property tax exemption. Appellant, a widower, was denied an exemption because the statute offers no analogous benefit for widowers. He then sought a declaratory judgment in country Circuit Court, which held the statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, finding the classification "widow" valid because it has a "fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation" of reducing "the disparity between the economic capabilities of a man and a woman."</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></b></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/416/351.html#f6" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> Sexism against men is fine if you claim your <B>intent</b> is to help women overcome <B>perceived</b> disadvantages (not necessarily discrimination) of their sex. <A HREF="id47.htm" TARGET="_top" TITLE="Gender wage gap hoax"><U>Gender wage gap hoax</U></A> quoted as "evidence". No one suggests that it is merely an administrative convenience to assume ALL women are in need and no men are.</div> <bR> <div> <B>SCHLESINGER v. BALLARD, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 172 WIDTH="496"><div> Appellee, a naval officer with more than nine years of active service, who failed for a second time to be selected for promotion and thus under 10 U.S.C. 6382 (a) was subject to mandatory discharge, brought this action claiming that application of that statute to him when compared to 10 U.S.C. 6401 (under which had he been a woman officer he would have been entitled to 13 years of commissioned service before a mandatory discharge for want of promotion) was an unconstitutional discrimination based on sex in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=419&invol=498" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> The court decided that since only a man's rights were at stake "<I>it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.</I>" and that the sexism was justified by on these grounds. </div> <bR> <div> <B>STANTON v. STANTON, 421 U.S. 7 (1975)</b> </div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 172 WIDTH="496"><div> When appellant wife and appellee husband were divorced in Utah in 1960, the decree, incorporating the parties' stipulation, ordered appellee to make monthly payments to appellant for the support of the parties' children, a daughter, then age seven, and a son, then age five. Subsequently, when the daughter became 18, appellee discontinued payments for her support, and the divorce court, pursuant to a Utah statute which provides that the period of minority for males extends to age 21 and for females to age 18, denied appellant's motion for support of the daughter for the period after she attained 18</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/421/7.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> The <B>intent</b> of this law, a rare thing, was to protect men more than women, or rather (and perhaps that explains its existence) boys more than girls, and there were <B>perceived disadvantages</b> to boys that it was addressing. The court dismissed this intention saying, "<I>Notwithstanding the "</I>old notions<I>" cited by the state court that it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home, that it is salutary for him to have education and training before he assumes that responsibility, and that females tend to mature and marry earlier than males, there is nothing rational in the statutory distinction between males and females</I>". The court seems inclined to dismiss out of hand such "role-typing" ideas even when they are the same ideas (e.g.. the wage gap) used to justify discrimination favoring women. Seems like a just result, but one that contradicts the way a woman's case would be handled.</div> <bR> <div> <B>CRAIG v. BOREN, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)</b> </div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 134 WIDTH="496"><div> Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age the equal protection of the laws</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/429/190.html#t13" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> The court went with its "administrative convenience" argument again and dismissed the presentation of evidence that men were more likely to be drunk drivers than women on the grounds that men were still very unlikely to be drunk drivers. It seems that the court is happy to give men equality where it does not do any harm to women.</div> <bR> <div> <B>CALIFANO v. GOLDFARB, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 191 WIDTH="496"><div> Under the Social Security Act survivors' benefits based on the earnings of a deceased husband covered by the Act are payable to his widow regardless of dependency, but under 42 U.S.C. 402 (f) (1) (D) such benefits on the basis of the earnings of a deceased wife covered by the Act are payable to her widower only if he was receiving at least half of his support from her. In a suit challenging these provisions, a three-judge District Court held that the different treatment of men and women mandated by 402 (f) (1) (D) constituted invidious discrimination against female wage earners by affording them less protection for their surviving spouses than is provided to male employees. </div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/430/199.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> By dressing up this issues as an issue of female rights (for the wage earner) not male rights (for the widower) a positive result was achieved. Note how throughout the decision it is treated as discrimination against women. It's easy to see how the blame game would have justified the opposite result at the drop of a hat. Not that the court would be interested in deciding what was <B>fair</b> at this point. Remember the point is whether the law was made with the <B>intent </b>of overcoming female discrimination. In fact arguments that <B>it was</b> were ignored claiming they were "<I>supported by no more substantial justification than "archaic and overbroad" generalizations</I>".  <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/446/142.html#t3" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U><B>WENGLER v. DRUGGISTS MUTUAL INS. CO., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) </b></U></A><B> </b>is a very similar case. Here the distinction between whether the law is perceived as benefiting women (acceptable) or men (unacceptable) is key to the defense: "<I>the Missouri Supreme Court stated that "the purpose of the [law] was to favor widows, not to disfavor them</I>". The supreme court basically replies, no you are wrong, its discrimination against women wage earners so its unconstitutional. Dang. <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/420/636.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U><B>WEINBERGER v. WIESENFELD, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) </b></U></A>is an earlier case so I should rewrite this block and move it up. Huh.</div> <bR> <div> <B>CALIFANO v. WEBSTER, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) </b></div> <div> Webster asked that his social security payments be increased to the amount he would have received if he had been a woman arguing that the discrimination violated the equal protection clause of the 5th amendment.</div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 115 WIDTH="496"><div> Thus, the legislative history is clear that the differing treatment of men and women in former 215 (b) (3) was not "the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about females," Califano v. Goldfarb, ante, at 223 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), but rather was deliberately enacted to compensate for particular economic disabilities suffered by women</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=case&court=us&vol=430&invol=313#320" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A><FONT SIZE="3" COLOR="#000000" FACE="Arial" > </FONT></div> <bR> <div> <B>ORR v. ORR, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 57 WIDTH="496"><div> ...an Alabama court, acting pursuant to state alimony statutes under which husbands but not wives may be required to pay alimony upon divorce, ordered appellant to make monthly alimony payments...</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/440/268.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> A pretty open and shut case but interesting because the court here makes it thinking clearer than usual IMO. [1] The law <B>establishes a classification</b> of people, based on sex [2] to be legal it must <B>serve important governmental objectives</b> and it must be shown that these classification/s <B>substantially relate to achievement of those objectives</b>. [3] These objectives must be the <B>intent</b> of the law but judging the intent seems to be something which is given more leeway than previously where it had to have been seen to be the intent at the time of making the law. Now it seems any sensible justification anyone can come up with that isn't actually an ad-hoc pretext, will do.[4] classifications are gauged to see if they are an <B>accurate proxy </b>for the objective. That is that the classification correlates well the behavior the objective is interested in, and that nothing better is easily available [5] Finally the objectives must not be able to be met without the discriminatory classifications, and the "need" to save administrative expenses is not acceptable as excuse.</div> <bR> <div> <B>PARHAM v. HUGHES, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 115 WIDTH="496"><div> A Georgia statute, while permitting the mother of an illegitimate child, or the father if he has legitimated the child and there is no mother, to sue for the wrongful death of the child, precludes a father who has not legitimated a child from so suing. Appellant, the father of an illegitimate child, whom he had not legitimated and who was killed, along with the mother, in an automobile accident, sued for the child's wrongful death</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/441/347.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> The court said that fathers and mothers of illegitimate children were "<I>not similarly situated</I>" because men could <B>and on this result would have to</b> go to court to try and have the child made legitimate. The court seems very happy to continue to make decisions based on old fashioned prejudices about men's roles and responsibilities, while constantly mentioning the need to make no assumptions about women.</div> <bR> <div> <B>CABAN v. MOHAMMED, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 229 WIDTH="496"><div> Appellant and appellee Maria Mohammed lived together out of wedlock for several years in New York City, during which time two children were born. Appellant, who was identified as the father on the birth certificates, contributed to the children's support. After the couple separated, Maria took the children and married her present husband (also an appellee). During the next two years appellant frequently saw or otherwise maintained contact with the children. Appellees subsequently petitioned for adoption of the children, and appellant filed a cross-petition. The Surrogate granted appellees' petition under 111 of the New York Domestic Relations Law, which permits an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the adoption of their child simply by withholding her consent</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/441/380.html#t10" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> The law denies rights to men which the court is usually happy to rectify, but in this case the subject is parenthood. Fortunately the model father in this case is hard to stereotype as a deadbeat and wins albeit with the narrowest of majorities -- four justices dissenting. Its worth reading their "reasoning" to get a handle on how biased their views on sex are. If this comment was taken seriously it would reverse almost every precedent: "<I>if we make the further undisputed assumption that the discrimination is justified in those cases in which the rule has its most frequent application - cases involving newborn infants and very young children in the custody of their natural mothers, see nn. 7 and 12, supra - we should presume that the law is entirely valid and require the challenger to demonstrate that its unjust applications are sufficiently numerous and serious to render it invalid.</I>" This is a breathtaking statement and, despite the result, is good evidence of how the court has different standards for men and women.</div> <bR> <div> <B>PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR OF MASS. v. FEENEY, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 172 WIDTH="496"><div> During her 12-year tenure as a state employee, appellee, who is not a veteran, had passed a number of open competitive civil service examinations for better jobs, but because of Massachusetts' veterans' preference statute, she was ranked in each instance below male veterans who had achieved lower test scores than appellee. Under the statute, all veterans who qualify for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying nonveterans. The statutory preference, which is available to "any person, male or female, including a nurse,"</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/442/256.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> Following the lead of race-based decisions concerning "<B>disproportionably adverse</b>" laws which are worded neutrally, the court affirmed that discrimination must be the desired intent, and not just an obvious consequence of the law.</div> <bR> <div> <B>KIRCHBERG v. FEENSTRA, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 115 WIDTH="496"><div> In 1974, the husband of appellee Feenstra, without her knowledge, executed a mortgage on their jointly owned home as security on the husband's promissory note to appellant (Kirchberg). The husband executed the mortgage pursuant to a now superseded Louisiana statute (Art. 2404) that gave a husband the unilateral right to dispose of jointly owned community property without his spouse's consent</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/450/455.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> The interesting point here is not the law, which was certainly sexist rubbish (and had been promptly changed by Louisiana even before the case got to the supreme court -- <B>note that Louisiana is not the appallee</b>), but the fact that "<I>under Art. 2334 of the Louisiana Civil Code, in effect at the time Mr. Feenstra executed the mortgage, Mrs. Feenstra could have made a "declaration by authentic act" prohibiting her husband from executing a mortgage on her home without her consent. By failing to take advantage of this procedure, Mrs. Feenstra, in appellant's view, became the "architect of her own predicament</I>". This argument seems to be the same as the court itself used in <B>PARHAM v. HUGHES</b> but this time they rightly reject it saying, "<I>As we have previously noted, the "absence of an insurmountable barrier" will not redeem an otherwise unconstitutionally discriminatory law"</I> In other words if there was some way for the injured party to avoid the discrimination it is still discrimination.</div> <bR> <div> <B>MICHAEL M. v. SONOMA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, 450 U.S. 464 (1981)</b> </div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 153 WIDTH="496"><div> Petitioner, then a 17 1/2-year-old male, was charged with violating California's "statutory rape" law, which defines unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the information on both state and federal constitutional grounds, asserting that the statute unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender since men alone were criminally liable thereunder. </div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/450/464.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> Its worth reading through this decision to see how craven the supreme court can be when it comes to protecting the little woman. Fortunately there were 3 voices of dissent and the dissenting view lists <B>some</b> of the screw-ups. Court notes that California's stated <B>intent</b> was to prevent (criminalize) teenage pregnancy. This doesn't prevent the court going on irrelevantly in a suspiciously patriarchal way about how much young girls suffer with pregnancy and how young boys never do and are always trying to get some. The court notes that only women get pregnant and then with twisted logic says that since pregnancy is the target of the law it makes sense that only the sex that <B>doesn't</b> get pregnant should be punished. <B>Sorry, isn't that a bit backwards?</b> Most people know it takes both sexes to have a baby, but if you are going to chose just one its hard to see how men are more proximally involved than women. The court then says you couldn't expect a law that punished women for having sex to be enforceable -- oh gee well that <B>is a good reason</b> for sex discrimination of the most blatant kind. </div> <bR> <div> <B>ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 249 WIDTH="496"><div> The Military Selective Service Act (Act) authorizes the President to require the registration for possible military service of males but not females, the purpose of registration being to facilitate any eventual conscription under the Act. Registration for the draft was discontinued by Presidential Proclamation in 1975 (the Act was amended in 1973 to preclude conscription), but as the result of a crisis in Southwestern Asia, President Carter decided in 1980 that it was necessary to reactivate the registration process, and sought Congress' allocation of funds for that purpose. He also recommended that Congress amend the Act to permit the registration and conscription of women as well as men. Although agreeing that it was necessary to reactivate the registration process, Congress allocated only those funds necessary to register males and declined to amend the Act to permit the registration of women</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/453/57.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> The court pretty much shuffles its feet and mumbles something about giving congress wide deference especially in military matters. Pass the buck time. In the end of course making the selective service register women wouldn't decrease the number of men sent to their deaths, or increase women's share of danger one bit. When it comes to killing only men in war no one is very keen on equality suddenly.</div> <bR> <div> <B>MISSISSIPPI UNIVERSITY FOR WOMEN v. HOGAN, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 96 WIDTH="496"><div> The policy of petitioner Mississippi University for Women (MUW), a state-supported university which has from its inception limited its enrollment to women, of denying otherwise qualified males (such as respondent) the right to enroll for credit in its School of Nursing violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/458/718.html#t8" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> In ruling that a man could enter an all female nursing school the court seems to almost surprise itself, "<I>That this statutory policy discriminates against males rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce the standard of review</I>" and the dissenting view (two of nine justices) is telling, "<B>In my view, the Court errs seriously by assuming - without argument or discussion - that the equal protection standard generally applicable to sex discrimination is appropriate here. That standard was designed to free women from "archaic and overbroad generalizations" In no previous case have we applied it to invalidate state efforts to expand women's choices.</b>" It seems the reason for the ruling is that Hogan wanted to join MUW in such a stereotypically female course. The court could not stomach the idea, seriously used as a defense, that more women were needed as nurses because of discrimination against women.</div> <bR> <div> <B>LEHR v. ROBERTSON, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 153 WIDTH="496"><div> The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/463/248.html#t13" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <div> The court makes it clear that fathers have no rights to their children unless they earn them. Uniquely of all these cases no comparison is made between how the law is applied to a woman in similar circumstances. Hardly surprising since the court totally throws out all their rules and basically just says that <B>a bad father has no parental rights whatsoever</b>. Men must earn their way to equality by conforming to the courts ideas on stereotypical male behavior. "P<I>arental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological connection between parent and child. They require relationships more enduring</I>" is the opinion, but this is only applied to male parents, and at that unwed male parents. This is a clear prejudice.</div> <bR> <div> <B>UNITED STATES v. VIRGINIA et al., ___ U.S. ___ (1996) </b></div> <div> <TABLE BORDER="2" CELLPADDING="2" CELLSPACING="1" WIDTH="508" BORDERCOLORLIGHT="#C0C0C0" BORDERCOLORDARK="#808080" FRAME="BOX" RULES="ALL" ALIGN="BOTTOM" HSPACE="0" VSPACE="0" > <tR> <tD VALIGN=TOP BGCOLOR=#FFFFCC HEIGHT= 19 WIDTH="496"><div> (The Citadel / VMI case)</div> </tD> </tR> </TABLE></div> <div> <A HREF="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=search&linkurl=<%LINKURL%>&graphurl=<%GRAPHURL%>&court=US&case=/us/000/u20026.html" TARGET="_top" TITLE="http://caselaw.findlaw.com/scripts/getca"><U>FindLaw</U></A></div> <bR> <bR> <bR> <bR> <bR> <bR> <bR> <div> <B>    <p align="center"> <A HREF="http://rd1.hitbox.com/rd?acct=WQ5011298NZC45EN0&p=s"> <IMG SRC="http://hg1.hitbox.com/HG?hc=wf153&l=y&hb=WQ5011298NZC45EN0&cd=1&n=Fourteenth" height=62 width=88 ALT="Click Here!" border=0> </A> </p>    </b></div> </td> </tr></table></body>